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IN THE ,SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

WILLARD R. WOOD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
S1~REVELL--PATERSON

HARDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
8632

Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT,S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered on Decem-ber 18, 1956, in favor of the Plaintiff and against the De-fendant, after a trial before the Court without a jury. With
one exception, there is no dispute or conflict in the evidence.

On the evening of October 13, 1954, one Richard E.
Gore, an employee of Plaintiff, was operating Plaintiffs sta-tion wagon and supposedly was on his way from Salt La:ke
City toward Dugway, Utah, carrying with him a load of
supplies for a restaurant operated by the Plaintiff when he
was involved in an automobile collision with an automobile
owned and being operated by Wayne N. Stoker, who had
earlier been seen at Dugway, Utah, and supposedly was pro-3
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ceeding toward Salt Lake City, where he lived. (R. 10))
The accident occurred shortly before 9:00 p.m. near the
turn--off to Salt Air on U.S. Highway 40 between Salt Lake
~City and Tooele, Utah. (R 5.3.-56) Both drivers were killed
in the crash; and as far as is known, there are no eye wit.nesses. The cars apparently met head.-on and were both
practically deolished. The point of impact was determined
by the investigating officers to be three feet to the left of
the center line of the highway in respect to vehicles travel.ing toward Salt Lake Ci~y. (Exh. P8) .
Wayne N. Stoker was employed as a salesman for
1 Strevell~Paterson Hardware Company and was paid a salary
for his services, plus mileage for the use of his car in con.nection with the employer's business. (R. 40.-41) His
duties and responsibilities were to call upon government in. .
stallations in Utah including Dugway Proving Grounds,
Tooele Ordinance Depot, and the Deseret Chemical Supply.
(R. 43.-44) However, on the day of the accident, he had
not made any calls at any of the government installations.
(R. 8) Nor did he have with him the Company catalogue
which contained a list of the some 30,000 odd items offered
for sale by StreveUs. (R. 45, 46, 72) It would have been
extremely difficult to have conducted any business without
thi~s catalogue. (R. 48, 49, 72)
There is no evidence as to his activities in the forepart
of the day. The first evidence of his whereabouts was given
by Mr. Howard Rich, the owner and operator of Los Ricos
Station (located cubout 10 miles east of Dugway) who testi. .
fied that Mr. Stoker came to his place of business about
4:00 p.n1. in the afternoon. Mr. Stoker remained at the
Los Ricos Station for approximately an hour during which
tim·e he demonstrated a 22.-caliber revolver to a sergeant who
4
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purchased the weapon from Mr. Rich. Mr. Rich a:lso testi-fied that he placed an order for merchandise with Mr. Stoker.
This is the evidence which is in dispute, Appellant claiming
that no order for merchandise was in fact placed with or ac-cepted by Strevell--Paterson Hardware Company. The evi-dence showed that Mr. Stoker had no responsibility or duty
to call upon. the Los Ricos Station or to solicit business there-from, (R. 47, 73) although Appellant Company had accept-ed orders previously placed by Rich with Stoker and had
during the year 1954 filled approximately six such ovders
from the Los Ricos Station which had been taken by Mr.
Stoker. (R. 76) Mr. Rich also testified that he loaned
Mr. Stoker $10.00 (R. 26), ($8.25 of which was found on
Mr. Stoker's person after the collision). (R. 98) The evi-dence further discloses that Mr. Stoker stopped at a place
called Penney's about 20 miles closer to Salt Lake City,
where he ate his supper. (R. 8)
Mr. Stoker apparently\ left the Los Ricos Station
between 4:30 and 5:00p.m. (R. 34) In addition to stop-ping at Penney's for supper he had traveled approximately
55 " 60 miles toward Salt Lake City when the accident oc-curred. There is no evidence as to what other activities he
engaged in either during the day or in the evening other than
what is indicated above.
Insofar as the driver of Plaintiffs automobile is con-cerned, the evidence discloses that at approximately five
minutes to seven on the evening of October 13th, the day of
the accident, Richard Gore came to the trailer apartment of
Wanda Ba:ll, his cousin. At that time he drove up to the
trailer at a great rate of speed. Mrs. Ball testified that his
·eyes were very bloodshot; that he stammered a little bit; and
that she could smell the odor of alcohol on his breath. He

5
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asked her for something to eat and she gave him three cups
of black coffee. Thereafter, he advised her that he had to
get back to Dugway whereupon she urged him to remain so
that her husband could take him out and he said that he
would not do so, ""If your husband took me back to Dugway,
then I would probably lose my job.,, When he got into the
station wagon she observed an empty bottle of whiskey on
the seat by him which he tossed out as he drove away. His
·driving ""was quite jumpy,, as he left. It was nearly 7:30
p.m. and he was ""definitely intoxicated,, when he left. (Stip.ulation of Mrs. Balrs testimony, pp. 1.-2).
The parties stipulated that if Plaintiff was entitled to
recover the sum of $1,700.00 was the reasonable value of the
station wagon which was demolished in the accident. The
Trial Court determined the issues in favor of the Plaintiff
and against the Defendant and awarded judgment in that
amount. It is from this judgment and the Findings and Con..
elusions of the Trial Court in favor of the Plaintiff, that the
Defendant has appealed.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Both at the trial and in connection with this appeal, De.fendant and Appellant has raised two points to be deter..
mined by the Court:
1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a find,
ing that Wayne N. Stoker was negligent in the operation ot
his vehicle, which negligence proximately caused the col,
lision; and
2. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a find'
ing that at the time of the accident the deceased, Wayne N.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Stoker was driving an automobile in the course of his em-ployment with the Defendant, Strevell--Paterson Hardware
Company.

ARGUMENT

I
THE EVID,EN,CE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTAB-LISH THAT WAYNE N. STOKER WAS NEGLI-GENT PR:OXIMATELY CAUSING THE CO,LLISIO~N.
The only evidence which Plaintiff introduced tending
to establish any negligence on the part of Wayne N. Stoker
was the evidence of the police officers who made the investi-gation and determined from the debris on the highway that
the point of impact was three feet to the left of the center
bne of the highway considered from the standpoint of cars
proceeding eastwardly toward Salt Lake City. Actually,
there is no concrete evidence to establish in which direction
either car was traveling. It is apparently assumed that be.cause earlier in the evening 'Stoker was some distance west
of the place of the accident and lived in Salt Lake City,
while Gore was in Salt Lake ,City and indicated he was in-tending to return to Dugway that the Stoker car was pro-ceeding eastwardly toward Salt Lake City while the Plain-tiffs station wagon was proceeding westerly toward Dug-way when the two vehicles met. Actually, the physical
evidence would more forcibly point to the conclusion that
Gore was traveling easterly and Stoker westerly since the
vehicles were facing generally in such directions after the
impact. (Exh. P8) There was no evidence as to the con-duct oT manner of operation of the automobile driven by
Mr. Stoker prior to or at the time of collision.

7
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The Plaintiff at the trial relied upon an alleged pre-sumption that where an accident occurs, the person whose
vehicle is proved to hav,e been on the wrong side of the road
is presumed to have been negligent until the contrary is
shown. There is also a presumption which arises where there
are no eye witnesses to an accident that a deceased person
was acting reasonably and with due care for his own
safety: Bechard v. Lake, 136 Me. 385, 11 Atl. 2d 265;
Edwards v. Perley, 223 Ia. 1119, 274 NW 910.
This rule was recognized by this Court in the case of
Mingus v. Olsson, (1949) 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495,
where the court stated that the presumption that a decedent
was in the exercise of due care for his own safety did not
apply where ""there was positive evidence not only as to the
fatal accident itself, but to the conduct of decedent leading
up to the fatal accident ..,.,
There were no eye witnesses to the accident in the
instant case, and therefore the· presumption that decedent
Wayne N. Stoker acted with due care for his own safety
should outweigh or at least negative any alleged presumption
that he was negligent by reason of the physical evidence
indicating the point of impact to have been on the wrong
side of the road if he was traveling easterly.
I-Iowever, we do not need to argue this point since the
matter has been recently determined by this Court in the case
of Fretz v. Anderson {1956) 5 Utah 2d 200, 300 P.2d 642.
There the decedent.,s automobile was turned over lying on
the wrong side of the road when the Plaintiff operating an
automobile along the highway in her proper lane collided
with it. In discussing the question of whether a presump'
tion exists where the person) involved is dead and not avail.able to testify this court held:
8
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""~hus,

the questions raised, although not new to
our law, present considerations beyond those normal to
a situation where the defendant, as driver of an auto.,.
mobile, is alive, and testifies in his own behalf. For
example, respondent cites a number of Utah cases hold-ing that there is a presumption of negligence where the
defendant encroaches on the portion of the street re-served for traffjc from the opposite direction. Clearly,
such a presumption is inapplicable to cases such as this,
where the defendant is unable to rebut the presumption,
even though the driver of the automobile had he lived,
might have been a:ble to produce evidence to show that
he was not negligent.,, (Italics added.)
In the light of the foregoing statement of lavJ, it would
appear that the trial court could not find that the decedent
Wayne N. Stoker was negligent in the operation of his
vehicle which proximately caused the collision. As heretofore pointed out there is a total lack of direct evidence of
the manner or direction in which Wayne N. Stoker drove
his automobile prior to the collision on the day in question.
f{owever, the evidence does disclose that at least until ap-proximately 4:30 to 5':00 p.m. when he left the Los Ricos
Station he had not had anything intoxicating to drink.
(R. 2 5, 26) Too, the fact that the amount of change in his
pocket would be approximately the amount of the loan made
to him by Mr. Rich less the cost of his dinner meal which he
had at Penney,s, would indicate that he had made no other
purchases from the time he left Los Ricos Station until the
time of the accident some four hours later. On the other
hand, we have testimony in the record which might very
well indicate that the Plaintiffs employee was negligent in
the operation of Plaintiff,s station wagon. The fact that
Mr. Gore was intoxicated approximately an hour prior to
the time of the impact and that he appeared to be in a hurry

9
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when he left the home of his cousin in Salt Lake City would
be sufficient evidence from which the court should have
determined that Gore was negligent which proximately
caused the accident.
Defendant's testimony, while not establishing in which
direction either car was proceeding, would negative any pre.sumption which the trial court might attempt to invoke that
the Stoker automobile was on the wrong side of the road and
therefore that the driver thereof was negligent. The testi.mony of Mr. Jack Nell was to the effect that as an investiga.tor he went out to the scene of the accident on the morning
after it occurred, and observed that at the railroad crossing
(approximately 2 59 feet south of the point of impact) there
was a large depression in the highway at a point approxi.mately one foot to the right of the center line for traffic pro-ceeding i~ a~ easterly direction. (R. 88, Exh. D 4) This
indentation was sufficient to deflect vehicles traveling along
the highway at about 50 miles per hour onto the wrong side
of the road. (R.89) At the same time, Mr. Nell observed
other cars traveling to Salt Lake City and what happened
when they struck the rut. He also made tests with his own
vehicle traveling at a speed of approximately 50 mile8 per
hour and found that as the left front wheel of the vehicle
would hit the depression immediately north of the track, the
vehicle would be deflected onto the wrong side of the road
a distance of two to four feet. (R. 89.-91)
In view of these facts, Appellant contends that even if
this Court were to indulge in a presumption that Stoker's
vehicle was proceeding easterly and was on the wrong side
of the road at the time of impact, such presumption would
not justify the further presumption that Stoker was negligent
in view of the uncontradicted evidence as to the character..
10
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istics of the highway, .the physical condition of the operators
of both vehicles, and the general circumstances under which
the accident occurred. Certainly, the measurement of three
feet from the center line of the highway to the point where
the officers determined the impact to have occurred was
not a sufficient distance to justify the Court in determining
that the driver of either car was any more negligent than the
other. The lane for west bound traffic at that point was
ten and one--half feet wide so that there still would have
been more than six feet of clearance from the point of im-p2ct to the edge of the hard surface, plus a width of six
feet of solid shoulder onto which the west bound vehicle
could have been operated if in fact the other car was pro-ceeding along the wrong side of the road. (Exh. P 8)
The testimony of the police officer was to the effect
that the impact between the automobiles was head--on indi-cating that the vehicles vvere traveling in opposite directions
at 180 degree angles. Therefore, this was not a case where
at the last moment either driver had turned abruptly to one
side or the other. If the eastbound vehicle had been caused
to deviate from a direct course along the highway by the
depression in the road at the railroad tracks it would have
been traveling on the wrong side of the road for approxi-mately 259 feet, during all of which time it would have been
in clear view of the other vehicle proceeding in the opposite
direction. On the other hand, if the west bound vehicle was
being operated by an intoxicated driver it might well have
been weaving from one side of the road to the other so that
the other driver in attempting to get out of the way may
have turned to the wrong side of the road at a time when
the intoxicated driver was making a similar movement with
his vehicle ther~by causing the two vehicles to crash from
11
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opposite positions. At all events, if the decedent Stoker ha~
been traveling on the wrong side of the road for any aprect..
able length of time, the decedent Gore would have been neg.ligent in failing to move or to otherwise change the course of
·his travel so as to avoid the collision. See, Farrell v. Camer.
on, 98 Utah 68, 94 P.2d 1068.

II
THE EVIDEN·CE IS INSUFFICIENT
TAIN A FINDING THAT WAYNiE N.
WAS OPERATING HIS AUTOMOBILE
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

TO SUS.STOKER
WITHIN
AT THE

TIME OF THE COLLISION.
The burden was upon the Plaintiff to prove by a pro.
ponderance of ·the evidence that Wayne N. Stoker was, at
the time of the accident, operating his motor vehicle within
the course and scope of his employment with the Defendant
Strevell..-Paterson Hardware Company. This we believe the
Plaintiff has failed to do. The evidence is wholly lacking
as to any services which Stoker performed for and on be.half of his employer on the day of the accident, at least prior
to the time he entered the Los Ricos Station at about 4:00
p.m. in the afternoon. The testimony is that it was left
primarily to Mr. Stoker,s judgment as when and under what
circumstances he contacted the government installations to
which he was assigned. He might very well be away from
his work part of a day. (R. 72) However, the only
customers on whidh he had any duty or responsibility to
call were government installations; and the evidence is un"
contradicted that he made no contact with or call upon either
of those agencies on the day in question. (R. 8) Where
he was prior to the time he came to Los Ricos is not known,
12
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but the testimony is that the company would never have
authorized a trip from Salt Lake to Willow Springs to make
a contact with the Los Ricos Station. (R. 77) In other
words, the value of any contact with the Los Ricos Station
or any order which might be obtained would not have
justified the expense of travel from Salt Lake City to Willow
Springs (a distance of approximately 68 miles) . As a
matter of fact, the evidence discloses that neither Mr. Kuhre
the sales manager, nor Mr. Mansell the treasurer of the
company had any knowledge that Stoker was calling at the
Los Ricos Station or that any orders were being taken by
him from Mr. Rich the owner and manager of the station.
(R. 44, 73) Only six orders had been taken by Mr.
Stoker during the year prior to October 13, 19 54, which had
been accepted by the company at the time they were turned
in without, however, any of the management knowing any"
thing concerning the orders. (R. 76, 77)
While it is true that there is some testimony in the
record that an order was actually placed by Mr. Rich at
the Los Ricos Station with Mr. Stoker on the afternoon in
question, the evidence on this matter is in conflict.
Shortly after the accident in question, Mr. Rich had
a conversation with a Mr. David Ellis who was employed
as an investigator for the insurance company carrying work.men's compensation insurance for Strevell.-Paterson Hard.ware Company. It was stipulated between the parties that
}vir. Ellis, if called as a witness, would testify at the time
he talked to Mr. Rich, Mr. Rich told him that on the after.noon of October 13, 1954, Mr. Stoker came to the Los
Ricos Station and talked awhile, visiting in the place of
business; that during the time he was there Rich gave Mr.
Stoker $57.72 and placed an order for a Smith E? Wesson
13
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K--22 revolver which Mr. Stoker agreed to deliver the follow-ing day. However, Mr. Rich made no mention to Mr. Ellis
about any other items of merchandise being purchased or
ordered from Mr. Stoker. The only item referred to and
claimed to have been ordered was the Smith c.? Wesson re-volver. (R. 95) However, at the time Mr. Stoker"s body
was examined immediately following the accident the only
money found on his person was the sum of $8.25, (R. 98).
Neither was the purported order for the Smith C? Wesson
K--22 revolver ever honored or accepted by Strevell--Pater-son Har·dware Company nor pressed by Mr. Rich at the
Los Ricos Station. (R. 26, 28, 35, 36) It is significant
that when Mr. Rich was called as a witness in the instant
matter and testified on direct examination, he stated that he
had ordered several items of merchandise from Mr. Stoker
on the afternoon of October 13th but in no way mentioned
that he had ordered the Smith & Wesson K--22 revolver.
(R. 18, 23) The reason that Mr. Rich testified he ordered
various items of merchandise from Mr. Stoker on the after-noon of the 13th might very well be explained on the basis
that in fact the next day following the accident he did place
an order by telephone with Strevells which was accepted and
filled. (R. 18) Peculiarly enough, this telephoned order did
not include any order for a K.-22 Smith & Wesson revolver.
(Exh. P 5) If Mr. Rich was so anxious to get the revolver
immediately that he paid Mr. Stoker for it on the afternoon
of the 13th, certainly he would have been just as anxious
to have the company send out the revolver the next morning
when he telephoned in an order for shells and other mer"
chandise. Likewise, if he had placed the order with Mr.
Stoker for ~he shells and other merchandise on the afternoon
of the 13th, and had mentioned that fact the next day in
repeating the order, Mr. Boyd who received the telephoned
14
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order would have made some notation to check to see that
the alleged order given to Stoker the preceding day had not
been filled or turned in. (R. 8 3) Mr. Boyd testified there
was nothing on the written order (Exh. D 10) to indicate,
nor could he remember any reference by Mr. Rich to, a
pre~ious order. In fact, Mr. Boyd wrote the order up in the
name of Howard Rich whereas Stoker had previously taken
orders under the name of Los Ricos Station. If Mr. Rich
had told Mr. Boyd a'bout alleged order to Stoker, Mr. Boyd
would have in turn placed the telephoned order in the same
name. Actually the order from Mr. Rich on October 14th
did not come in the morning but came in too late in the day
to be filled that day. (R. 84)
The numerous inconsistencies above pointed out make
it hard to believe that any order for merchandise was placed
by Mr. Rich with Mr. Stoker on the afternoon of the 13th
of October. However, even though such an order was
placed can it be said that by reason of the isolated, incidental
contact by Stoker with an account he had no responsibility
or right to contact, under the circumstances here presented
resulted in Mr. Stoker being within the course and acting
within the scope of his employment not only then but there-after until he had returned to his home. Mr. Stoker was
free to use his own discretion as to when he called upon
the customers of the company; but Los Ricos Station was
not a known or even recognized customer. When the evi-dence is undisputed that he made no calls upon his assigned
customers on the day in question there can be no presump-tion arise that he was acting within the course or scope of
his employment in driving his vehicle about the country
side. Nor did the company pay him or his estate anything
on account of the mileage which may have been run on his

15
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automobile on the day in question.

(R. 49)

Whether an individual who is operating his own car,
is acting in the course of his employment for another must
depend upon the circumstances in each individual case.
However, certain standards have been laid down by the
courts to assist in makinSI0 this determination. In P. F.
Collier &? Son v. Drin~water, 81 F2d 200, the court dis.cussed the matter a:s follows:
""The ground of liability of the master for the neg"
ligent act of the servant is not that the servant repre.sents the master in such act of negligence, but that he
is conducting his master's affairs and that the master
is bound to see that 'his affairs are so conducted that
others are not injured. Philadelphia E.? R. Coal E.?. Iron
Co. v. Barrie (CCA 8th) 179 F. 50, 52, 53. As said
by Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts in the leading
case. of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Corp., 4
Mete. 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339, 340; "It is laid down by
Blackstone, that if a servant, by his negligence, does
any damp,ge to a stranger, the master shall be answer"
able for his neglect. But the damage must be done
while he is actually employed in the master's service;
otherwise, the servant shall answer for his own misbe.havior. 1 Bl. Com. 431; McManus v. Crickett, 1
East, 106. This rule is obviously founded on the great
principle of social duty, that every man, in the manage,
ment of his own affairs, whether by himself or by his
agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not to
injure another; and if he does not, and another there
by sustains damage, he shall answer for it.,
""It is in application of this principle that the doc,
trine respondeat superior is held to apply "only when
the relation of mast~r and servant is shown to exist
between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be
charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the
16
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time and in respect to the very transaction out of which
the injury arose." Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N·~.Y. 248, 33
N.E. 381, 383, 19 L.R.A. 285; Martin v. Greensboro.Fayetteville Bus Line, 197 N.C. 720, 150 S.E. 501;
Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N.C. 794, 147 S.E. 296.
""And in Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson ( CCA
8th) 152 F. 681, 682, the late Judge Walter H. San.born laid down a test for the application of the rule
respondeat superior, which is an aid to clear thinking
in a case such as this. He said: "The test of one's
liability for the act or omission of his alleged servant
is his right and power to direct and control his im.puted agent in the performance of the causal ·act or
omission at the very instant of the act or neglect.
There can be no recovery of a person for the act or
omission of his ._ alleged servant under the maxim,
""respondeat superior,.,, in the a:bsence of the right and
power in the former to command or direct the latter in
the performance of the act or omission charged, because
in such a case there is no svperior to respond .., .,.,
In the case of Preferred Accident Insurance Company
v. Alfred Grasso, CCA (2) 186 F2d 987, the court held
that an employee while driving to work in the garage owned
by the employer was not within the course of his employ.ment, although the car '\Vas being used for the purpose of
enabling the employee to better serve the employer.
In Cain v. Marguez, 31 ·Cal. App. 2d 430, 88 P.2d 200,
the court held that an employee driving the employer.,s auto.mobile to lunch ""is not engaged in furthering any end of
the employer, and that therefore under such circumstances
the servant is not acting within the scope of his employ"
ment ..,.,
In Allen v. Ross, 200 Ar~. 104, 138 S.W. 2d 409, the
court held that a salesman who was driving the employer.,s
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automobile up and down a street looking for his lady com-panion was not engaged in the course of his employment
even though he had immediately before made a collection for
the employer.
In Postal Telegram--Cable Company v. 'Thomas, 83 F.2d
608, the court held that a messenger boy who was driving
his mother.,s automobile to his place of employment to advise
his employer that he could not come to work because his
bicycle was in the repair shop being repaired (after the boy
had driven the car to the bicycle shop to check on the
bicycle) was not engaged in the course of his employment.
See, also, McCauley v. Steward, 63 Ariz. 534, 164 P.2d 465.
In Blan~ v. Coffin, 20 Cal. 2d 457, 117 P.2d 53, (later
opinion 126 P.2d 868) the court answered the argument
that if the employee had a right to drive the car as he desired
and turned in his expense account and mileage to the com-pany, the company would be licrble for his acts in operating
the company vehicle, as follows:
""Respondent,s employees to whom cars were
assigned were obligated to turn in weekly reports show-ing the total mileage travelled and the amount of gasoline and oil consumed for which reimbursement was
sought by the employee. They were not required to
set forth in said reports where or between which points
the car had been driven, and Coffin carefully avoided
making any charge against the company for gasoline
and oil which he might have consumed for his own
pleasure. Appellant argues in effect that nevertheless
it would have been feasible for the co~pany to have
a~certained the number of miles per gallon of gasoline
the coupe made and then to have checked the total
mileage as shown by the weekly report with the number
of gallons of gasoline charged against the company and
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that if it had done so it could have discovered that Cof-fin was using the car for some purpose other than in
the company,s business. But admittedly this was not
done; and no such discovery was made; nor has ap-pellant called attention to any statutory or judicial ru1e
r~quiring an employer, in order to protect himself from
lia:bility in cases of this type,, to adopt or carry on any
minute checking system of the kind here suggested.
Therefore, since admittedly no such discovery was
made, there is nothiQ.g upon which to base an inference
of permissive use.,,
In Bayless v. Mull, 50 Cal. App. 2d 66, 122 P.2d 608,
the employee was a salesman authorized to take ~he employ. .
er,s car to show and demonstrate to prospective purchasers.
"."No restrictions were imposed upon hirh as to the locality
to which he might drive the car nor the manner in which or
the length of time he could use it; except that where he ex-pected to be gone for some period of time it was his duty to
indicate on the company,s bulletin board such fact. On the
day of the accident he took the car here involved at 4:30 in
the afternoon and made notation of the necessary facts on
the bulletin board. As he had a prospective purchaser on
61st Street just off Broadway he drove the car to the pros-pecfs home. There he learned the prospect was not at home
but would return later in the evening. He then drove down
town and had dinner with a friend who lived on 79th Street
just off Broadway. As he planned to return to his prospect,s
home he offered to take his friend to her home. Accom-panied by his passenger he drove down Broadway and passed
61 st Street, on which the prospect lived, in order to take his
friend to her home on 79th Street before proceeding to the
home of his prospect. The accident occurred at 79th Street
before proceeding to the home of his prospect. The accident
occurred at 79th Street and Broadway, where, as hereto-19
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fore stated the Plaintiff was run down in a pedestrian lane
'
crossing Broadway."
Upon the foregoing facts, the court held that the evi.dence failed to show a master.-servant relationship at the
time of the accident.
The most prominent Utah case on the subject is Saltas
v. Afflec~, 99 Utah 65, 102 P.2d 493 where the court held:
""The trial court was not in error in directing the
verdict in favor of the defendant because the doctrine
of respondeat superior is not applicable. Appellant
argues that the question of whether the agent was with.in the scope of his employment should be submitted to
the jury. The employee's action resulting in the acci.dent was not a mere deviation from the course of the
employment as was involved in Carter v. Bessey, 97
Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, in which case this court held
that the question should properly be submitted to the
jury. See also Burton v. LaDuke, 61 Utah 78, 210 P.
978. Here there was a departure from the course of
the employment and the employer's responsibility for
the acts of his employee had ceased. When the em,
ployee has clearly -departed from the scope of his em,
ployment there is no question to be submitted to the
jury. Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 60
Utah 346, 208 P. 519; Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co., 46 Utah 502, 151 P. 53; Wright v. Inter,
mountain Motorcar Company, 53 Utah 176, 177 P.
23 7."
Defendant respectfully submits that the Plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof devolving upon him to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent,
Wayne N. Stoker, was operating his car within the scope of
his employment with the Defendant Company.
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The burden of proof being upon Plaintiff and Respon..
dent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence not only
that Wayne N. Stoker was negligent in the operation of
his vehicle, which negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision, but also that at the tin1e and place of the accident
the said Wayne N. Stoker w_as acting within the scope of
and that the accident arose out of the course of employment
of the said Wayne N~ Stoker with the Defendant Strevell.Paterson Hardware Company, we submit that the Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment of the trial court should be
reversed and set aside on the ground that the Plaintiff has
failed to sustain such burden either as to the agency or the
negligence of the decedent Wayne N. Stoker.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Nielsen and Conder
Attorneys for Appellant
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